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Abstract
Ladyman and Ross (LR) 2007 argue that quantum objects are not
individuals (or are at most weakly discernible individuals) and use
this idea to ground their metaphysical view, ontic structural realism,
according to which relational structures are primary to things. LR ac-
knowledge that there is a version of quantum theory, namely the Bohm
theory (BT), according to which particles do have definite trajectories
at all times (Bohm 1952; Bohm and Hiley 1993). This would suggest
that quantum particles are individuals after all, with position being
the property in virtue of which particles are always different from one
another. However, LR refer to research by Brown et al. (1996) which
they interpret as saying that in BT, the properties normally associated
with particles (mass, charge, etc.) are inherent only in the quantum
field and not in the particles (in BT it is assumed that a particle is
always accompanied by a quantum field). It would then seem that
there is nothing there in the trajectories unless one assumes the ex-
istence of some “raw stuff” of the particle. In other words it seems
that haecceities are needed for the individuality of particles of BT, and
LR dismiss this as idle metaphysics. In this paper we point out, fol-
lowing Brown et al.(1996, 1999) that it is reasonable to assume that
in BT properties such as mass and charge also reside in the particles
(the principle of generosity). Thus, if BT is correct, quantum objects
might be individuals after all. However, we move on to emphasize that
Bohmian quantum individuals, while in some ways similar to classical
particles, also differ from these radically. We will discuss this issue in
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the light of new developments in the underlying mathematical struc-
tures, due to de Gosson and Hiley. In particular, we will show how the
mathematical structure of the double cover of the underlying symme-
try groups help to understand the relation between classical dynamics
and quantum dynamics, as well as the similarities and differences be-
tween classical and quantum individuals. We conclude that while BT
enables us to retain the notion of individuals in non-relativistic quan-
tum theory, these individuals are very different from those of classical
physics. It is likely that they can be best understood in the context of a
structuralist, process-oriented view, such as Bohm and Hiley’s broader
implicate order framework. Thus, while we think that the prospects
of individuality in quantum theory are stronger than what LR imply,
we agree with them that structuralist considerations are important in
fundamental physics more generally.
The usual interpretation of the quantum theory implies that we
must renounce the possibility of describing an individual system
in terms of a single, precisely defined conceptual model. We
have, however, proposed an alternative interpretation ...which
leads us to regard a quantum-mechanical system as a synthesis
of a precisely definable particle and a precisely definable ψ-field...
(Bohm 1952a: 188)
1 Introduction.
Perhaps the greatest challenge to the notion that objects are individuals
with well-defined identity conditions comes from modern quantum and rela-
tivity physics. For, ever since the early days of the quantum revolution, the
identity and individuality of quantum systems has frequently been called
into question (see e.g. French 2011 and the references therein; French and
Krause 2006; Ladyman and Ross 2007, ch 3).
Many of the founding figures of quantum theory, and most notably Niels
Bohr, held that it is not possible to describe individual quantum objects and
their behaviour in the same way as one can in classical physics. Quantum
phenomena are often thought to be holistic in such a way that we have to
be careful when applying our common sense notions of individual objects
when speaking of quantum objects such as electrons (for a recent penetrating
discussion of the Bohr approach, see Plotnitsky 2010). The idea that quantal
objects might, in some sense, be “non-individuals” was also considered early
on by, for example, Born, Heisenberg and Weyl (French 2011: 6).
One of the physicists who almost throughout his career emphasized the
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wholeness of quantum phenomena was David Bohm (1917-1992). For exam-
ple, in his 1951 text-book “Quantum Theory”, he characterized individual
quantum objects in strongly relational and contextual terms:
...quantum theory requires us to give up the idea that the elec-
tron, or any other object has, by itself, any intrinsic properties
at all. Instead, each object should be regarded as something
containing only incompletely defined potentialities that are de-
veloped when the object interacts with an appropriate system
(1951: 139).
His work on the implicate order, which begins to develop in the early
1960s, aims to develop a deeper underlying theory from which quantum
theory and relativity can be derived as approximations, and their relation
thus understood. This framework suggests a strongly structuralist, process-
oriented way of understanding individual quantum systems. At an early
phase of this work Bohm wrote:
In this theory ... the notion of a separately existing entity sim-
ply does not arise. Each entity is conceptually abstracted from
a totality of process... with the electron, what actually exists is
a structure of underlying elementary processes or linkages sup-
porting a pattern corresponding to an electron. (1965a: 291).
In the later implicate order view, an electron is not a little billiard ball that
persists and moves, but should more fundamentally be understood as
...a recurrent stable order of unfoldment in which a certain form
undergoing regular changes manifests again and again, but so
rapidly, that it appears to be in continuous existence (Bohm
1980: 194).
Finally, in their 1993 book Undivided Universe Bohm and Hiley, when
discussing quantum field theory and emphazising the ontological primacy of
movement required by relativity, summarize this non-individualistic line of
thought as follows:
...the essential qualities of fields exist only in their movement
[...] The notion of a permanently extant entity with a given
identity, whether this be a particle or anything else, is ... at best
an approximation holding only in suitable limiting cases. (1993:
357).
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Thus much of Bohm’s work supports the idea that individuals are not meta-
physically fundamental in the light of contemporary physics. Bohm’s empha-
sis on notions such as “structure process” (1965b), “order” and “movement”
(1980) as fundamental in physics, suggests that the philosophical home of
Bohm (and Hiley’s) general approach to physics might well be found in
some form of scientific structuralism which takes movement as fundamental,
rather than in a metaphysics which takes individuals as basic (cf. Ladyman
and Ross 2007).
However, as is well known, just after completing his 1951 text-book,
Bohm discovered an interpretation of quantum theory which seems to give
individuals a much stronger status than the usual interpretation of quan-
tum theory. While acknowledging the wholeness of quantum phenomena,
Bohm had grown dissatisfied with the usual “Copenhagen” interpretation.
In particular, he felt this interpretation failed to address what is taking place
between measurements, and after discussions with Einstein, began to look
for an alternative (for his own account of this see Bohm 1987).
In 1952 he published two papers that proposed an interpretation of quan-
tum theory in terms of “hidden variables”. This interpretation provides a
hypothetical description of individual quantum systems. It may help to
begin to see the relevance of Bohm’s 1952 interpretation to the question of
individuality if we consider how he contrasts his approach with that of Bohr.
Bohm writes:
...Bohr suggests that at the atomic level we must renounce our
hitherto successful practice of conceiving of an individual system
as a unified and precisely definable whole, all of whose aspects
are, in a manner of speaking, simultaneously and unambiguously
accessible to our conceptual gaze. ... in Bohr’s point of view, the
wave function is in no sense a conceptual model of an individual
system, since it is not in a precise (one-to-one) correspondence
with the behavior of this system, but only in a statistical corre-
spondence (1952a: 167-8).
In contrast to this, Bohm’s alternative interpretation regards
...the wave function of an individual electron as a mathematical
representation of an objectively real field (1952a: 170).
Thus for Bohm, an individual quantum-mechanical system has two as-
pects:
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it is a synthesis of a precisely definable particle and a precisely
definable ψ-field which exerts a force on this particle (1952b:
188).
In this particular early approach, it is assumed that the particle has a
well-defined position and momentum at all times and it thus moves along a
trajectory. Actually, Bohm had independently rediscovered and made more
coherent Louis de Broglie’s 1927 pilot-wave model; this interpretation has
thus also been called the de Broglie-Bohm theory. Other names which de-
note different versions of the approach, include “the causal interpretation”,
“Bohmian mechanics” (see Goldstein 2013) and “the ontological interpreta-
tion” (Bohm and Hiley 1993). In this paper we refer to this approach as “the
Bohm theory” and follow Bohm’s own preferred way of thinking about the
approach which gives an important role to the so called quantum potential
energy.
Now, if the Bohm theory is a coherent option, it undermines the ar-
guments of those who claim that non-relativistic quantum theory somehow
forces us to give up the notion that quantum objects are individuals with
well-defined identity conditions. Ironically, as the above quotes show, there
is clearly also a tension between the Bohm theory and much of Bohm’s own
other more structuralist and process-oriented work - both before and after
1952.
The question of whether quantum particles are individuals is also raised
by the philosophers James Ladyman and Don Ross in their thought-provoking
and important book Every Thing Must Go (2007, hereafter ETMG). They
advocate the view that quantum particles are not individuals, (or, at most,
are weakly discernible individuals). They acknowledge that there seem to
be individuals in the Bohm theory, but, on the basis of Brown et al.’s (1996)
discussion, judge these to involve haecceities and imply that such Bohmian
individuals can be dismissed as idle metaphysics.
In this paper we shall be focusing on the 1952 approach and its later de-
velopments, as well as with Ladyman and Ross’s evaluation of its relevance to
the question of individuality of quantum objects. We suggest that the Bohm
theory shows that there is room for individuals in at least non-relativistic
quantum theory, albeit these “Bohmian individuals” are very different from
simple classical particles. However, it is important to keep in mind that
Bohm and Hiley’s more general implicate order approach (which seeks to
unite quantum theory and relativity) does not give individuals such a strong
status and is in some ways similar to Ladyman and Ross’s structuralist ap-
proach. Thus, although we will below criticise Ladyman and Ross’s reading
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of the non-relativistic Bohm theory, we think that their overall structuralist
approach seems fruitful when seeking a more general theory (such as the
implicate order) which can reconcile quantum theory and relativity.
In what follows we will first give a brief account of Ladyman and Ross’s
views on individuality in quantum mechanics (section 2). We then introduce
the Bohm theory, focusing on the way it seems to have room for quantum
individuals (section 3). In section 4 we first present Ladyman and Ross’s
criticism of Bohmian individuality and then go on to challenge this criticism
by drawing attention to the fact that Brown et al (1996, 1999) suggest that
in the Bohm theory, it is not unreasonable to assume that properties such as
mass and charge also reside in the particles (cf. French 2011: 14; French and
Krause 2006: 174). We then illustrate the nature of Bohmian individuals
by considering the transition from quantum to classical behavior and the
explanation of the AB-effect in terms of the quantum potential (section 5).
In section 6 we try to obtain a deeper mathematical insight into the issue
by considering the Bohm theory in the light of new mathematical develop-
ments in symplectic geometry due to de Gosson and Hiley. This discussion
examines more closely the relation between the classical Hamilton-Jacobi
equation and its quantum counterpart, equation (3) below. We find a much
closer relation between these two mathematical structures than is generally
recognised and argue that this has a direct consequence for the question
of individuality. In conclusion, we suggest that in non-relativistic quantum
theory, whether or not particles are individuals is a genuinely open question
in a stronger sense than Ladyman and Ross imply. However, we note also
that Bohmian individuals can best be understood in terms of notions such
as “structure process”, which suggests an affinity to Ladyman and Ross’s
structuralist approach.
2 Ladyman and Ross on individuality in quantum
mechanics.
In the third chapter of ETMG, Ladyman and Ross discuss identity and in-
dividuality in quantum mechanics. Following French and Redhead (1988),
they first establish that indistinguishable elementary particles, that is par-
ticles that have the same mass, charge etc., behave differently in quantum
mechanics than they do in classical statistical mechanics. For quantum
particles an ‘indistinguishability postulate’ states that a permutation of in-
distinguishable particles is not observable and thus those states which differ
only by a permutation of such particles are treated as the same state with
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a different labelling. This might point to the view that quantum particles
are not individuals.
Individuality is however an ontological property whereas (in)distinguishability
is an epistemic one. So how are these two related? Ladyman and Ross iden-
tify three candidates in the philosophical tradition for individuality:
1. transcendent individuality: the individuality of something is a feature
of it over and above all its qualitative properties;
2. spatio-temporal location or trajectory;
3. all or some restricted set of their properties (the bundle theory) (ETMG,
p. 134).
#1 above is ruled out because it involves haecceitieshecce, and thus in-
volves what Ladyman and Ross would consider idle metaphysical specula-
tion. Granting this restriction for the sake of the argument, the interesting
candidates are #2 and #3
A connection between individuality and distinguishability is given by
the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII), which can be taken
roughly to state that no two objects have exactly the same properties. It
is easy to see that everyday objects satisfy both #2 and #3, while the
point particles of classical mechanics satisfy #2. Then for both everyday
objects and particles of classical mechanics PII is true and individuality and
distinguishability can be taken to be the same thing. However, for certain
quantum systems neither #2 nor #3 seems to hold. Ladyman and Ross
take as an example of such a state the singlet state of two electrons orbiting
a helium atom:
ψ = 1/
√
2[| ↑〉1| ↓〉2 − | ↓〉1| ↑〉2)] (1)
Here any property that can be ascribed to particle 1 can also be ascribed
to particle 2. So in this state the two electrons share all their extrinsic and
intrinsic properties, thus falling foul of both #2 and #3. So it would seem
that quantum particles are not individuals.
However, this conclusion might follow from a too strict a notion of dis-
cernibility. Following Saunders (2003a, 2003b, 2006), Ladyman and Ross
give three notions of discernibility:
(i) absolute discernibility
(ii) relative discernibility and
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(iii) weak discernibility.
These can be defined as follows (ETMG, p 137):
(i) “Two objects are absolutely discernible if there exists a formula in one
variable which is true of one object and not the other”. This holds for
ordinary everyday objects.
(ii) “Two objects are relatively discernible just in case there is a formula
in two free variables which applies to them in one order only. ...[T]he
points of a one-dimensional space with an ordering relation, since, for
any such pair of points x and y, if they are not the same point then
either x > y or x < y but not both”.
(iii) “Two objects are weakly discernible just in case there is two-place
irreflexive relation that they satisfy.” The Fermions in a singlet state
are discernible in this sense, as they satisfy the relation ‘is of opposite
spin to’.
Now since electrons in the singlet state are discernible they can be
viewed as individuals. But they are weakly discernible. This is a
thoroughly structuralist view “...as individuals are nothing over and
above the nexus of relations in which they stand.” (ETMG, p. 138.)
3 The Bohm theory
Now let us turn to consider how the Bohm theory deals with these situations.
It is assumed that every particle has a well-defined position and momentum
and is accompanied by a field ψ which satisfies the Schro¨dinger equation
i~
∂ψ
∂t
= − ~
2
2m
∇2ψ + V (r)ψ (2)
If we make a polar substitution
ψ(r, t) = R(r, t) exp[iS(r, t)/~]
and then separate out the real and imaginary parts, we find two equations,
firstly
∂S
∂t
+
1
2m
(∇S)2 +Q+ V = 0 (3)
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where
Q = − ~
2
2m
∇2R
R
(4)
is known as the quantum potential. The second equation
∂P
∂t
+∇.
(
P
∇S
m
)
= 0 (5)
is a probability conservation equation. We also identify
p = ∇S.
This is known as the guidance condition, from which the trajectory of the
particle can be calculated. Figures 1 and 2 provide well-known visualiza-
tions.
Figure 1: Quantum potential for two Gaussian slits
So there is a version of quantum theory (the Bohm theory) according to
which each particle has a definite and distinct trajectory at all times. This
suggests that quantum particles are individuals, with position being the
property in virtue of which particles are always different from one another.
The biggest problem for retaining the notion of individuality is particles
in entangled states described by equation (1). This is an entangled spin
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Figure 2: Trajectories for two Gaussian slits
state which has been discussed in detail by Dewdney, Holland, Kyprianidis
and Vigier (1988), but for our purposes here it is sufficient to consider a gen-
eral two-body wave function, ψ(r1, r2, t) and use the two-body Schro¨dinger
equation to find
∂S
∂t
+
(∇1S)2
2m1
+
(∇2S)2
2m2
+Q(r1, r2, t) + V (r1, r2) = 0 (6)
The second and third terms in this equation correspond to the kinetic en-
ergies of each particle so once again the problem of individuality does not
seem to arise in the Bohm theory. The information about the entanglement
is encoded in the non-local quantum potential energy term Q(r1, r2, t). Fur-
thermore since the trajectories do not cross, we follow Brown, Sjo¨qvist and
Bacciagaluppi (1999: 233) and conclude that indistinguishable fermions will
always have distinct trajectories (for further discussion see French 2011:
14-15; French and Krause 2006: 178). Thus individuality is preserved.
4 The Bohm theory and haecceities
So the Bohm theory seems to suggest, contra Ladyman and Ross, that quan-
tum particles can be individuals in a stronger sense than they claim. They
do acknowledge the existence of the Bohm theory in a footnote, but do not
see it as a problem for their non-individualistic view. They write:
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Of course, there is a version of quantum theory, namely Bohm
theory, according to which QM is not complete and particles do
have definite trajectories at all times. However, Harvey Brown
et al. (1996) argue that the ‘particles’ of Bohm theory are not
those of classical mechanics. The dynamics of the theory are
such that the properties, like mass, charge, and so on, normally
associated with particles are in fact inherent in the quantum
field and not in the particles. It seems that the particles only
have position. We may be happy that trajectories are enough to
individuate particles in Bohm theory, but what will distinguish
an ‘empty’ trajectory from an ‘occupied’ one? Since none of the
physical properties ascribed to the particle will actually inhere
in points of the trajectory, giving content to the claim that there
is actually a ‘particle’ there would seem to require some notion
of the raw stuff of the particle; in other words haecceities seem
to be needed for the individuality of particles of Bohm theory
too. (ETMG, p. 136 fn.)
Note first that as we have already indicated, Ladyman and Ross are some-
what one-sided in reporting the views of Brown, Elby and Weingard (1996).
For in their paper Brown et al. are not arguing for the view that in the
Bohm theory, properties like mass, charge, and so on, normally associated
with particles are only inherent in the ψ-field and not in the particles. What
they do argue for is that certain experiments (for example, certain types of
interferometry experiments) rule out the possibility that these properties are
associated with the Bohm particle alone. They point out that there are two
principles we can adopt here. Firstly, there is the principle of generosity,
according to which the properties can be attributed to both the ψ-field and
the particle.
Secondly, there is the principle of parsimony according to which proper-
ties such as mass are attributes not of the particle but of the ψ-field alone.
They do not take a definite stand on which principle we should adopt. How-
ever, they draw attention to reasons to adopt the principle of generosity,
while at the same time indicating difficulties inherent in the principe of par-
simony. It thus seems clear that, contra what Ladyman and Ross suggest,
they are more in favor of the principle of generosity. To be fair, however,
we should acknowledge that the issue is subtle and people’s views on this
vary– it seems that Harvey Brown himself was in favor of parsimony before
opting for generosity. For Brown et al. (1996) acknowledge that the princi-
ple of parsimony is implicit in Brown’s earlier work; they also note that it
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is implied by some of Bell’s suggestions (Bell 1990, 30).
In this paper we reject the principle of parsimony and argue for a par-
ticular version of the principle of generosity. Note especially that we are not
arguing that Bohmian individuals are mere particles. Instead, we propose
that the particle and the ψ-field should not be considered as separate enti-
ties, and thus a Bohmian individual is something that has both of these as
two different aspects – but it is still an individual. This sort of idea goes
back to at least Bohm’s 1957 book Causality and Chance in Modern Physics,
where he wrote:
...our model in which wave and particle are regarded as basically
different entities, which interact in a way that is not essential
to their modes of being, does not seem very plausible. The fact
that wave and particle are never found separately suggests in-
stead that they are both different aspects of some fundamentally
new kind of entity which is likely to be quite different from a
simple wave or a simple particle, but which leads to these two
limiting manifestations as approximations that are valid under
appropriate conditions. (1957/1984: 80)
Note especially that, according to the 1957 Bohm, the ontological mes-
sage of quantum theory is not that quantum objects are not individuals; it
is rather that they are fundamentally new kind of individuals.
So, are Bohmian particles bare? Let us go into this question in greater
detail. Brown, Dewdney and Horton (1995) introduce and define the lo-
calized particle properties thesis (LPP): particle properties (such as mass,
charge etc.) are attributes of the particle rather than the ψ-field. That is
the mass, say, of the particle is localized at the position of the particle at
all times. They go on to point out that several experiments seem to violate
the LPP.
In neutron interferometry experiments of Colella, Overhauser, and Werner,
(1975), the ‘shifted’ interference pattern created by a neutron stream trav-
eling through a beam splitter along two routes, one with at higher gravita-
tional potential than the other. According to the Bohm theory the particle
travels one of the paths while the ψ-field travels both paths. Brown et al
note that if we assume that all of the electron’s gravitational mass is concen-
trated in the path where the particle is, it becomes difficult to understand
intuitively why the interference pattern is shifted. For if the empty path
ψ-field carries no gravitational mass, how could the difference in the gravi-
tational potential integrated over the two paths be felt by the particle? So
they argue that for gravitational mass, the LPP seems to be violated.
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In the Aharonov-Bohm effect a similar thing happens for charge, as noted
by Brown, Sjo¨qvist and Bacciagaluppi (1999, p. 234 fn):
The expression for the phase shift due to the flux in the shielded
solenoid depends on the electrons charge being present on spatial
loops within the support of the wave function and enclosing the
solenoid.
But again the trajectory of the Bohmian particle associated with the charged
particle does not encircle the solenoid. So the LPP seems to be violated for
charge.
It is clear that LPP was motivated by the classical concept of a particle.
But why should we expect a ‘quantum particle’ to be a simple ‘classical
particle’? Already Weyl (1924) has warned us:
Hence a particle itself is not even a point in field space, it is
nothing spatial (extended) at all. However, it is confined to a
spatial neighbourhood, from which its field effects originate.
He even goes as far to call the concentrated region of field, an “energy-
knot” which propagates in empty space just as a water wave advances over
the surface of the sea.
We noted above how Bohm himself wrote in 1957 that the notion of a
simple particle in his model is an approximation. But this leaves us with
the question of what is the nature of the “fundamentally new kind of entity”
that is the true Bohmian individual.
5 Bohmian individuals
To obtain a better understanding of the nature of Bohmian individuals, let
us return to examine the context in which quantum theory arose in the first
place in more detail. In order to do this we must first re-examine classical
dynamics in the context of the Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) theory. It should be
remembered that this theory was developed at the beginning of the 19th
century for utilitarian reasons, namely, to make it easier to solve Hamilton’s
equation of motion for planetary systems. However it was soon realised that
it provided an overall unifying description of classical mechanics emphasising
that symplectic symmetry that lies at the heart of classical kinematics.
The solution of the classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation gives an ensemble
of possible trajectories, but of course, the particle takes only one of these
trajectories. Which trajectory it takes depends on the initial position of the
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particle i.e., where it actually was at t = 0. Thus it is the presence of the
particle that accounts for which trajectory is actually taken. If you have
this initial information, you will be able to predict at which point a particle
will hit, say, a screen placed perpendicular to the expected trajectories.
In the Bohm approach (Bohm and Hiley 1993), attention is focussed on
the quantum version of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (3). This equation will
also give an ensemble of trajectories, but these trajectories will, of course,
differ from those derived from a classical HJ equation simply because of the
presence of the additional term which has been called the quantum potential
energy (QPE).
For the time being, let us retain the notion that the particle has simul-
taneously a precise position and momentum at all times, then its position
at some initial time ti will determine which trajectory it follows. But in the
quantum case there is, of course, a difference from the classical case. In the
latter we can, in principle, ‘place’ a particle at any initial point with any
initial momentum we care to choose, so that we, ourselves, can choose which
trajectory the particle will take.
This option is not open to us for the quantum particle. We cannot
control the initial position and momentum simultaneously, so that we cannot
‘place’ the particle at a given position of our choice, together with a pre-
determined momentum. This is the message of the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle. Nevertheless it is the key assumption in the Bohm model that the
particle always has a simultaneously well-defined position and momentum,
even though we do not know nor can we control what these values actually
are. To produce our particle experimentally, we have to rely on sources
such as a furnace, or an electron gun or even a quantum dot, sources that
can only produce a distribution of initial conditions. Each particle in that
ensemble will have a definite initial position and momentum as it enters the
experiment and it is those values that determine the particular trajectory it
will follow. The fact that we cannot control this initial position is irrelevant
to the hypothesis that it actually has a definite position and momentum.
It is clear that different experimental arrangements will produce differ-
ent ensembles of trajectories and this difference is encoded in the QPE. The
solution of Schro¨dinger’s equation will determine the form of the QPE. Sup-
pose we have a situation in which the quantum potential is time dependent
and actually becomes smaller as time progresses, then we can show that
the ensemble of trajectories merge smoothly into the classical ensemble of
trajectories. Thus a particle following a trajectory in the quantum domain
will become a particle obeying the rules expected of a classical particle.
A simple model illustrating this merger was presented by Hiley and Mufti
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(1995). In our view these results present strong evidence that it is a coherent
possibility that a particle keeps its identity and individuality in a quantum
context, even though some of its energy is involved exploring its environ-
mental neighbourhood. According to this model the whole process is an
individual coherent process, but notice it need no longer be a point-like pro-
cess. This means that the notion of individuality in the quantum domain
is very different from the way it is understood classically (as indeed antic-
ipated by Bohm in his remarks quoted above (1957:88). Moreover, this is
something that Niels Bohr (1958), too, noticed, a point that we will discuss
in more detail later.
With this in mind, let us now turn to examine the properties of the
quantum potential in the experimental situation that involves the AB effect.
Because of the intriguing questions raised by the AB effect, Philippidis,
Bohm and Kaye (1982) decided to calculate the quantum potential and the
trajectories in the AB experiment. The result for the quantum potential is
shown in figure 3.
If we compare this QPE with that shown in figure 1, where no flux is
present, we see that the pattern of the quantum potential has been shifted
off the axis of symmetry due to the presence of the enclosed flux. This, in
turn, produces a shift in the ensemble of trajectories as was shown in Philip-
pidis, Bohm and Kaye (1982). This resulted in an overall pattern shift which
has actually been observed in experiment (see Bayh (1962)). Note that a
similar result will apply to the gravitational case. From these two examples
we see that the form of the quantum potential energy depends on the whole
experimental arrangement and not merely on the local interactions with the
classical fields. Bohr (1958) famously emphasized the importance of the ex-
perimental arrangement. By using the real part of the Schro¨dinger equation
which includes the quantum potential, we see clearly why the experimental
conditions are a vital feature of quantum processes, thus supporting Bohr’s
important point.
6 The Role of the Hamilton-Jacobi Theory
The way we have derived the quantum Hamilton-Jacobi equation (3) hides
a much deeper relation between classical and quantum dynamics. Math-
ematically, as we have already remarked, they have a common kinematic
symmetry, namely, the symplectic group of transformations. As Melvin
Brown (2006: v) has succinctly put it,
[t]his very general group of transformations maintains the fun-
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Figure 3: The quantum potential for the Aharanov-Bohm effect. Notice the
asymmetrical shift
damental relationship between position and momentum in me-
chanics, and its covering group (the metaplectic group) corre-
spondingly transforms the wave function in quantum mechanics.
Assuming that the reader may not be familiar with the mathematics,
we will here approach the subject in a non-formal way (for a more technical
presentation, see e.g. de Gosson 2001; Brown 2006). Notice that unfortu-
nately we do not have a method of calculating the QPE or the trajectories
independently of the Schro¨dinger equation. However given the QPE, the
steps in solving the QHJ are identical to the steps in solving the classical
HJ equation.
What then is the significance of this relationship? To answer this ques-
tion let us consider in more detail the classical Hamilton-Jacobi theory. As
we have already remarked initially this theory was thought of as a useful tool
for solving Hamilton’s equations of motion because, by a judicious choice of
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canonical (symplectic) transformations, these equations can be reduced to
a form that can be more easily solved.
However Hamilton himself saw the theory in a different way. He noticed
that rays in optics could be described by Hamilton’s equation of motion by
identifying p with the angle of the ray to the optic axis.(See Guillemin and
Sternberg 1984). What about the wave properties? Hamilton suggested
that the surfaces of constant action were some form of wave fronts with
the rays (particle trajectories) perpendicular to these surfaces so that the
electromagnetic field energy could be regarded as flowing along the rays.
Notice in this way the energy is merely a concentration of field energy which
was eventually identified with the photon. Suggestive as this was, Hamilton’s
ideas were never compelling.
With the discovery of the wave properties of electrons and atoms, Schro¨dinger
again took up Hamilton’s ideas. In his second paper, which immediately
followed the one containing the announcement of what we now call the
Schro¨dinger equation, he notes that “classical mechanics is a complete ana-
logue of geometric optics”, and then adds, “Then it is the case of seeking
an “undulatory mechanics”– and the most obvious route to this is in fact
the form of the Hamiltonian picture based on the wave theory” (Schro¨dinger
1926). Schro¨dinger’s arguments to derive his equation can at best be heuris-
tic. Even Schro¨dinger himself, in the course of his derivation writes “I realise
that this formulation is not quite unambiguous”. But this should not be sur-
prising as the necessary mathematics of symplectic geometry did not exist
at the time this work was being done.
However the equation quickly gave results that agreed with experiment,
so that the equation was taken as an a posteriori given, independent of its
origins. It became the defining equation of quantum phenomena and as
a consequence of trying to understand this equation, the ‘wave function’
became the centre of attention. With this position came the paradoxes that
remain unresolved. Relatively few physicists or philosophers have attempted
a sustained exploration of the deeper mathematical background from which
the equation appears. Indeed the Schro¨dinger equation is taken as a given,
arising as if by magic. Even Feynman et al (1963) acknowledges that the
equation was not derived from anything known in physics or mathematics.
As he remarked: “It came out of the mind of Schro¨dinger”.
Since the first appearance of the Feynman lectures, big advances have
been made in the mathematical analysis of Hamilton dynamics, the Hamilton-
Jacobi theory and the ‘undulatory mechanics’ Schro¨dinger was looking for
(see de Gosson 2001 and 2010 for a readable comprehensive treatment of the
subject). This new work shows that there is a deep mathematical connection
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between Hamiltonian dynamics and Schro¨dinger dynamics.
The connection begins to emerge as we examine the common symmetry,
the symplectic symmetry, underlying both Hamiltonian dynamics and the
Schro¨dinger dynamics. These deeper connections have emerged relatively
recently in the mathematics literature and are just beginning to become
appreciated by the physics community. What one learns is that classical
mechanics and ray optics emerge at the level of the group itself, but wave
theory and quantum mechanics begins to emerge at the level of the double
cover of the group, the metaplectic group and its generalisation.
The importance of the double cover is a vital part of quantum mechan-
ics. We are already very familiar with this idea in the case of rotational
symmetry. Here the double cover of the rotation group is the spin group.
This gives us the spinor with which we describe fermions and these spinors
form the mathematical basis of the entangled singlet state given equation
(1) above. Furthermore it is the relation between the group and its cover
that gives us the explanation of the experimentally confirmed difference be-
tween a 2pi and a 4pi rotation that shows up with fermions (see Werner et
al. 1975).
The symplectic group then is the key to the dynamics. Hamiltons equa-
tions of motion are invariant under a symplectic transformation (this trans-
formation is traditionally known as a canonical transformation). What is
not so well known is how the double cover provides the link between classical
and quantum dynamics. To bring this out one needs to study symplectic
geometry and it is this geometry that provides new insights into the relation
between classical and quantum dynamics (see de Gosson 2001).
This is not the place to go into mathematical details and we will simply
point out some interesting results to bring out the unexpected connection
between classical and quantum mechanics. Firstly de Gosson and Hiley
(2011) have shown that if we formally “lift” a Hamiltonian flow onto the
double cover space, we find a unique flow in this covering space and this flow
satisfies a Schro¨dinger-like equation. It is ‘Schro¨dinger-like’ because at this
stage it contains an arbitrary parameter with dimensions of action to enable
us to put position and momentum on the same footing. The mathematics
alone does not enable us to identify this parameter with Planck’s constant.
Its value is determined by experiment as it is in the standard theory.
Secondly de Gosson (2010) draws attention to a deep topological theo-
rem in symplectic geometry known as the ‘Gromov no-squeezing’ theorem.
This states that even in classical mechanics, it is not possible to reduce
a canonical volume such as ∆x∆p by means of a Hamiltonian flow alone.
When this region is lifted into the covering space it provides the source of
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the uncertainty principle. In this way one can say that the symplectic fea-
tures of the classical word contains the footprint of the uncertainty principle
even at the classical level. This structure provides a rigorous mathematical
background for Schro¨dinger’s ‘undulatory mechanics’.
Let us follow up this relation between the Hamiltonian and Schro¨dinger
flows, as the time evolutions are called. The use of the term ‘flow’ is very
appropriate here because we are talking about the energy carried by their
respective fields; classically we have the motion generated by the action field
S(x, t) while in the quantum process we have two real fields, R and S where
S can now be interpreted as the phase in the wave picture. In the classical
limit R =a constant, while the phase S becomes the action, linking with
Hamilton’s original ideas.
Now we must consider how the individual, our central concern in this
paper, enters the picture. We have already seen how Hamilton considered
the optic ray as an element of the excitation energy of the field itself, a
forerunner of what we now call the photon. Thus when we generalise to the
Schro¨dinger case, we can regard the ‘trajectory’ as the locus of mean of some
invariant feature of the energy carried by the two real fields. In this view
the generating fields allows one to calculate the behaviour of a particular
‘particle’ that happens to be at a given point in space and time. There is no
separate ‘rock-like particle’ that needs to explore the whole of space. It is
the dynamics and its effective neighbourhood that determine the behaviour
of the individual.
Why do we say ‘the individual’? For this we need to consider an actual
experiment. It is now possible to find sources that produce a single particle
at a time, its dynamics is determined either by the Hamiltonian flow or by
the Schro¨dinger flow depending on the experimental set up. The individual,
its centre of energy then follows a particular trajectory defined by its initial
condition. In both the classical and quantum cases there is only one indi-
vidual. Indeed one can show that as the quantum potential energy becomes
negligible the quantum ‘particle’ becomes the classical particle. In other
words any interior structure of the particle can be neglected.
So far we have emphasised the similarity between the two flows. However
it is obvious that the flows are very different but in precisely what way are
they different? Let us start with a simpler question for which there is a
well-defined answer. Let us ask “What is the difference between the group
and its two-fold cover?” Locally they have the same Lie algebra, this algebra
defines the group in the neighbourhood of the identity. Thus in a very small
region about a given point, both flows are identical (see de Gosson and Hiley
2013 for a rigorous proof.)
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The difference arises from their global properties, namely, in the global
topology of the group manifolds. It is these global properties that dis-
tinguish between the symplectic and metaplectic groups. Thus lifting the
Hamiltonian flow onto the covering group means modifying the flow so that
it responds to the global properties of the metaplectic group. In other words
the Schro¨dinger flow must take account of this global topology and must be
able to distinguish sets of paths that belong to different elements of the
holonomy group.
In the case of the AB effect, the flow must reflect the difference between
those closed paths that encircle the enclosed flux and those that do not.
What this means is that the Schro¨dinger flow itself is a global flow, not a
local flow. When we analyse this flow in terms of the Hamilton-Jacobi theory
we find these global features are encoded in the quantum potential. In this
sense the QPE is not the source of a force acting on the particle. Rather
it is a potentiality for the behaviour of the particle-like process that finds
itself at a particular region in space. Then its kinetic energy, and therefore
momentum, is such as to satisfy the quantum HJ equation. In this way the
particle appears to be responding to a ‘force’ whereas in fact the particle
is following a trajectory defined by a global flow. Thus there is just one
individual particle whose evolution is determined by the Schro¨dinger flow.
In the AB situation, an ensemble of incident particles would then give
rise to a shifted interference pattern, the shift being determined by the en-
closed magnetic flux. Nowhere do we lose the identity of the individual
particle. This notion of individuality is strengthened when it is realised that
if the particle were not charged, then its Schro¨dinger evolution would be
very different and the fringe pattern would be unaffected by the presence of
any enclosed flux. In this sense the quantum potential energy is a ‘private’
energy; it is ‘individual’ in the sense of belonging to the individual parti-
cle. Note that this is an example where quantum theory seems to involve
stronger and more peculiar individuality than classical physics! This point
often left unnoticed in discussions of individuality in the quantum theory
where one typically emphasizes the non-individualistic aspects of the quan-
tum domain (see however Brown et al.1996: 313-4). If two particles are
conventionally described by a product of two wave functions and the par-
ticles do not interact through a classical potential, they do not experience
each others quantum potential even though they may both be in a region of
space where their factor wave functions have significant spatial overlap.
The radically different nature of individuality in the quantum domain
becomes more apparent when two or more particles become ‘entangled’ as
illustrated in equation (1). In the Bohm approach these particles are coupled
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by a common quantum potential energy. This potential is non-local in the
sense that the behaviour of one particle is ‘locked’, as it were, into the
behaviour of the other. In this case the Schro¨dinger flow involves both
particles, giving a time evolution that involves the two spatially separated
particles behaving as a single entity if uninterupted. It is tempting to see
such an entity as new type of individual, where we find a “twoness” in an
underlying individual whole. This is in contrast to two particles described by
a product of two wave functions, which can be seen as separate individuals,
as noted above.
If we return to examine the details of a pair of particles described by
equation (1), we can solve the two-body QHJ equation and find an ensemble
of correlated trajectories as has been shown by Dewdney et al. (1986, 1987,
1988). If one of the particles enters the field of a Stern-Gerlach magnet, it
is then deflected either ‘up’ or ‘down’ depending on the positions of each
particle at the time just before the particle enters the magnetic field. The
particle in the field has its trajectories changed while the other particle
continues in a straight line. This is a dramatic illustration of the non-local
effect of the quantum potential energy. But in spite of this non-local effect
the ensemble of trajectories is still determined by the QHJ.
The spin properties of the individual particles undergo some interesting
changes in this situation. In the initial singlet state, the individual particles,
although possessing spin-half, do not possess any component of spin. This
is consistent with the fact that the state of the pair has net spin zero, i.e.
S = 0, Sz = 0. This is a surprising result, but shows quite clearly that the
individual parts cannot be thought of as ‘little spinning spheres’, a point
that was emphasised by Weyl (1931).
However as one of the pair passes through the Stern-Gerlach magnetic
field, the quantum potential energy changes and this change manifests it-
self in the following way. The particle in the inhomogenous magnetic field
develops a z-component of the spin, while its partner develops the oppo-
site z-component in such a way that the total angular momentum is always
conserved.
Please note that this remarkable behaviour follows from the mathemat-
ics, from the QHJ which itself is a direct consequence of the Schro¨dinger
flow. To reach this stage we do not have to introduce any physical specu-
lation as to why the Schro¨dinger flow takes the form it does. Rather the
Schro¨dinger flow is a direct consequence of lifting the classical Hamiltonian
flow on the double cover space to exploit the global topological properties
of the covering group.
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One still might not be satisfied by this explanation. But then we are
faced with the question “How do particles with spin one-half exhibit their
2pi − 4pi behaviour?” Again the only answer we have is that quantum pro-
cesses exploit the properties of the double cover of the rotation group, the
spin group or more formally, the Clifford group. If we took the words of
Bohr seriously, we would expect the flow to be determined by the overall
experimental conditions. Bohr writes that it is impossible to make a
. . . sharp separation between the behaviour of atomic objects and
the interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to
define the conditions under which the phenomena appear (Bohr
1958: 39-40).
This, according to Bohr, means that we must give up any way of trying
to ‘picture’ what is going on but what he has not supplied is an adequate
reason as to why it is necessary to adopt such an extreme position and
to further claim there exists no other possibility. Indeed because of this,
commentators of the Bohr view have called it a ‘non-interpretation’ (Leggett
1982) or anti-realist (Faye 1991).
Our proposal is that it is the structural properties of the key symmetries
of motion and of space that necessitate such a position. This supplies a
structural raison d’etre for adopting this position. Of course one might not
be happy with leaving it as a mathematical theorem and would like some
underlying physical processes that necessitate the use of the covering group
structure. That is what Bohm (1980), Bohm and Hiley (1993, ch 15) and
Hiley (2011) have been trying to do by taking process as fundamental, but
this is another story that we will not go into here.
7 Concluding remarks.
We have above sketched a possible way one could understand the status of
individuals in the Bohm theory, in the light of recent explorations of the
underlying mathematical structures. It seems that the prospects of individ-
uality in the Bohm theory are stronger than Ladyman and Ross imply. This
suggests that there is an underdetermination of metaphysics by physics in
non-relativistic quantum theory when it comes to the question of individu-
ality (as indeed has been emphasized by French and Krause 2006: 189-197).
However, it is important to realize that the notion of an individual in the
Bohm theory is very different from what we would expect from the classical
perspective. For although the Bohmian quantum individual has a well de-
fined energy, that energy is not a local energy. This is consistent with Niels
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Bohr’s views in two ways. Firstly, as remarked above and re-emphasised
in Bohm and Hiley (1993), the particle is never separated from the quan-
tum field. It is an invariant feature of the total underlying process. This is
consistent with Bohr’s notion of the “impossibility of subdividing quantum
phenomena” in the sense that the whole experimental arrangement must be
taken into account (Bohr 1958:50-51).
Secondly, the individual is not a localised point-like object. As Bohr re-
marks (1958:73) the quantum process is a “closed indivisible phenomenon”.
The energy is not localised at a point. In fact complementarity can be taken
to imply that energy transcends space-time. Nevertheless there is a centre of
energy, a generalisation of the centre of mass which can be given a position
in space-time. It is this centre that moves with the Bohm momentum.
These ideas are not consistent with a classical notion of a particle and we
feel can only be given a proper meaning in terms of something like Bohm’s
(1965b) notion of “structural process”. Thus the overall Bohmian approach
to physics does not, from the metaphysical point of view, mean a return to
the individuals of classical physics, but has strong structuralist features. In
particular, and as was mentioned in the Introduction, Bohm and Hiley have
since the 1960s been developing broader scheme they call “the implicate
order”, which goes beyond the 1952 Bohm theory (Bohm 1980; Bohm and
Hiley 1993: ch15; Hiley 2011; Pylkka¨nen 2007; for Bohm’s own attempt
to reconcile ”hidden variables” and the implicate order, see his 1987). We
note that this scheme seems to have some relevant similarities to Ladyman
and Ross’s ontic structural realism, while there also may be some significant
differences. The discussion of these similarities and differences will, however,
be a subject of another study (some preliminary attempts have already been
made by Pa¨ttiniemi 2011 and Pylkka¨nen 2012).
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